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1 Introduction 
One of the oldest questions in economics is pricing of complements, with formal treatment dating 
back to Augustin Cournot’s 1838 treatise Cournot (1897). One needs both copper and zinc to make 
brass. Suppose that firm A is a monopolist selling copper and firm B is a monopolist selling zinc 
to brass producers. Cournot showed that the sum of the prices of A and B is more than what a 
monopolist selling the combination would charge. Prices are strategic substitutes and each firm 
has an incentive to raise its price higher than the single-monopolist level, since the other firm has 
an incentive to lower its price in response, in a sense, to subsidize the other firm’s price increase. 
In the resulting equilibrium, these complementary monopolists are worse than a single monopoly: 
the prices are higher than a single monopolist charges, hurting both the consumers and the firms 
themselves.1 
However, there is a clear potential Pareto improvement: the firms could lower prices to the 
single-monopolist level. Researchers since at least Coase (1960) postulated that, absent transaction 
costs, agents with a potential (legal) Pareto improvement, like the two complementary monopolists, 
should be able to arrive at a Pareto efficient outcome. 
Thus, the question is an empirical one: do the firms act as static complementary monopolists 
and arrive at a Pareto suboptimal outcome, as predicted by Cournot, or do they figure out a way 
not to leave money on the table, as predicted by Coase? We analyze this problem in the context of 
the U.S. freight railroads shipping coal. Controlling for the relevant route characteristics, we find a 
precise zero effect on price of having to ship through two firms as opposed to one. Thus, we argue 
that in the case of the U.S. freight railroads shipping coal, the Coasian prediction fits the data 
better. From the historical perspective, it is notable that in 1839 – a year after Cournot published 
his work in France – Charles Ellet, an American engineer, published an analysis of railroad pricing 
in the United States, using similar calculus-based methods and making many points similar to 
Cournot’s 1838 work, see Calsoyas (1950) for a review. 
Aside from other applications, our results should be of interest for the railroad industry: coal, 
together with intermodal freight, are the two largest rail commodities by revenue, with coal ac- 
counting for about 17% of freight railroads’ revenue in 2015, see Association of American Railroads 
(2016). Conversely, about 70% of coal is shipped via freight rail. Our results suggest that an 
end-to-end railroad merger would not be needed to fix a Cournot or double-marginalization-like 
pricing issue.2 
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We describe other applications below, including royalty stacking in intellectual property, vertical 
double marginalization (and mergers), and the tragedy of the anticommons. We also describe our 
method and why we believe that the railroad data set presents a unique opportunity to study this 
question. 
 
 
1Sonnenschein (1968) formalized Cournot’s arguments and showed that Cournot duopoly is the dual of this 
complementary monopoly. 
2Nonetheless, we do not analyze efficiencies, and thus a railroad merger could indeed result in lower prices to 
consumers due to that, as suggested for example by Ivaldi and McCullough (2005). 
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While making brass is important, arguably the most contested recent application of this analysis 
is in the area of intellectual property. Hundreds of different complementary patents might be needed 
to make a modern device, for example a cell phone. The concepts of royalty stacking or patent 
thickets, see Shapiro (2001) and Lemley and Shapiro (2006), are effectively Cournot’s analysis 
applied to intellectual property. The policy implications are clear: having many different patent 
holders that are all needed to make a product would result in an inefficient outcome with individual 
patent license rates (prices) that are too high. Other researchers, soon after, suggested that there 
are mechanisms in the market that prevent this Pareto-inefficient outcome, see for example Geradin, 
Layne-Farrar, and Padilla (2007), Elhauge (2008), and Sidak (2008). Even more relevant to our 
paper, see Spulber (2016) for a formal model of how negotiating and bargaining lead to a breakdown 
of the inefficient Cournot outcome. 
We discuss below some of the empirical research relating to patents and royalty stacking; how- 
ever, the common thread is significant data limitations. In short, there is no representative database 
where one could observe royalties that each manufacturer pays to each patent holder, as these 
negotiations are highly confidential and situation-specific, see Hagiu and Yoffie (2013). Even non- 
representative databases are non-existent as far as we know.3 Thus, the existing empirical research 
had to rely on secondary indicators, for example the size of the patent portfolio, the proclivity to 
patent, and the firms’ market value. 
In contrast, we use years of nationally-representative administrative data on pricing of railroad 
freight, allowing a direct test of the theory. Consider a shipper that wants to transport goods from 
A to C, a route that passes through B. We estimate whether the price paid from A to C is the 
same when the same railroad owns both AB and BC tracks as it is when one railroad owns AB and 
another owns BC. We estimate difference in prices by comparing otherwise similar routes, with the 
difference being whether the route is wholly-owned. We control for available characteristics of the 
route, including competitiveness of the railroads, and use a comparatively homogeneous product – 
coal. 
For identification, we believe that our treatment variable – whether a route is wholly-owned by 
the same railroad – is nearly as good as random conditional on observables. The specific junctions – 
points where railroads meet – are outcomes of factors that often date back to the mid 19th century 
when railroads in the U.S. were expanding.  Those factors determined which railroad had the 
resources to extend its tracks further, and thus whether a particular route ended up wholly-owned. 
While coal was, and continues to be, an important commodity for railroads, the locations where 
coal is mined changed dramatically since the 19th century. In particular, while currently Wyoming 
produces around half of the coal in the U.S., in the 19th century the leader was Pennsylvania, with 
virtually no production in Wyoming. The current coal production in Pennsylvania is around one 
tenth of that in Wyoming.  A potential weak point in this position is that endogenous mergers 
since that time have greatly changed the ownership patters of once separate lines; however, we do 
 
 
3A notable exception is some historical data on patent pools, for example see Lampe and Moser (2010) and Lampe 
and Moser (2013) analyzing 19th century patent pools for sewing machine patents. 
Loertscher, and Schneider (2010). 
4 
 
 
not believe that Cournot-like inefficiencies related to coal transportation were among the biggest 
drivers of these mergers. 
In addition to our main specification – a fixed effects pricing regression that was used in several 
existing studies both by academics and by regulators – we also use other methods to check whether 
our results are robust. As one alternative, we use machine learning methods, as outlined by 
Belloni and Chernozhukov (2013), Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014), and Chernozhukov, 
Chetverikov, Demirer, Duflo, Hansen, et al. (2016). The machine learning approach provides a 
way to validate our results without relying on the exact specification used in our main analysis. 
As another alternative, we construct propensity score for the treatment, separate observations in 
smaller blocks by propensity scores, run the same regression as in the fixed effects specification 
within each block, and then analyze the weighted average of the resulting coefficients. The method 
is described in Imbens and Rubin (2015), who recommend this method over other propensity score 
techniques (for example, propensity score matching) or a simple OLS regression. 
In addition to several methodological approaches producing the same answer, we also provide 
an identification robustness check by using a difference-in-differences approach to analyze prices 
following a merger that made two routes wholly-owned. To the extent that the premerger behavior 
was Cournot, a merger should decrease the price for traffic carried over the newly wholly-owned 
route. Also, given that this was a merger of two major railroads, but only two routes were affected, 
it is doubtful that the merger was undertaken specifically to change prices on these two routes. We 
also could not find any references to these routes in news stories around the time of the merger. Any, 
even in our view implausible, concerns with the identification strategy above should be alleviated 
by this analysis. While our estimate for this merger analysis is not as precise, our results are 
consistent with the main specification. 
This theoretical analysis had been applied in many other settings. Vertical double marginal- 
ization – a monopolist manufacturer selling through a monopolist retailer – is one of the main 
examples, see Spengler (1950). Vertical mergers and mergers of firms producing complementary 
products are generally viewed considerably more benignly than horizontal (substitutes) mergers, 
in part because of this very idea being that such a merger might alleviate the double marginaliza- 
tion/complementary monopoly concern.4 Complementary monopolies have also received plenty of 
attention from the strategy literature, with a prominent example of Microsoft (Windows) and Intel 
in the 1990s and 2000s producing complementary inputs to a personal computer, see Casadesus- 
Masanell and Yoffie (2007) and Casadesus-Masanell, Nalebuff, and Yoffie (2012). 
Similar discussions of whether inefficiency survives market forces appear in other settings as 
well. For example, in the vertical setting, a solution to this problem is well-known: a manufacturer 
could offer a two-part tariff, see Oi (1971). At least some of the empirical literature seems to agree 
that this is occurring in retail, see Villas-Boas (2007), although there are severe data limitations in 
that stream of research as well, due to the manufacturers’ marginal cost not being directly observed. 
4This branch of the literature is also related to foreclosure and tying, see for example Posner (1979), Moresi and 
Salop (2013), and Tirole et al. (2015). For a discussion of mergers of firms producing complements, see Anderson, 
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The same question appears in the literature on the tragedy of the anticommons, see for example 
Heller (1998), Heller and Eisenberg (1998), and Buchanan and Yoon (2000), with some of the work 
being specifically about patents. This literature also struggles with the Cournot-like issues of many 
owners of, to use an analogy from property law, various sticks of property rights for the same 
property, where someone needs to get everyone’s approval to get anything done. Similarly, the 
literature also mentions the Coasian possibility of negotiating to an efficient outcome. 
There were multiple empirical studies of patents that tried to shed light on this issue, and on 
the effect of patents on innovation in general, for example see Murray and Stern (2007), Cockburn 
and MacGarvie (2009), Gupta (2014), Cohen, Gurun, and Kominers (2015), Kiebzak, Rafert, and 
Tucker (2016), and Hegde and Luo (2017).5 Between these studies, one can find estimates that 
would support either conclusion. However, as noted above, none of the estimates that we are aware 
of have pricing data to test the theory directly, let alone pricing data at anything close to nationally 
representative level. 
The intellectual property literature on royalty stacking influenced the ideas of fair and reasonable 
non-discriminatory (FRAND) license terms and the discussion on patent assertion entities (PAEs, 
also sometimes referred to as patent trolls) and patent pools. See Chiao, Lerner, and Tirole (2007), 
Layne-Farrar, Padilla, and Schmalensee (2007), and Lemley (2007). Theoretical literature and 
models continued to develop, again pointing to an empirical question of whether the resulting 
equilibrium is closer to the work of Cournot or to the work of Coase, see for example, Llanes and 
Trento (2012), Lemley and Shapiro (2013), Lerner and Tirole (2015), Rey and Salant (2012), and 
Spulber (2013). 
 
2 Data 
Our data – the Waybill Sample – comes from the U.S. Surface Transportation Board (STB), the 
regulator of freight railroads in the U.S. There exists a version of the Sample for public use; however, 
that version has much information aggregated or otherwise masked for competitive reasons. Since 
this would not be as helpful for the purposes of our analysis, we went through a procedure outlined 
in 49 C.F.R. 1244.9(c)(1) to request the full sample for research use. The procedure is somewhat 
similar to a FOIA process that might be familiar to many researchers. The main difference is that 
the information request has to be published in the Federal Register, and any interested parties 
can comment on the request. In order to limit any competitive concerns or concerns regarding the 
impact of our findings on current railroad practices, we requested the data only up to and including 
2003. As noted above, our identification robustness check is a merger; however there were no major 
mergers since 2003 (for that matter since 1999), thus we did not believe that the more current years 
would have been particularly helpful. 
The sample includes a multitude of railroads. However, from 2001 to 2003 – the years that we 
use in our main analysis – there are four major railroads that comprise of about 80% of the overall 
 
 
5See also review articles, for example Boldrin and Levine (2013), Graham and Vishnubhakat (2013), and Khan 
and Sokoloff (2001). 
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volume. We use only these railroads in our main analysis. We use only the last three years because 
previous years had several mergers that could have affected prices in many ways. We discuss these 
mergers below and use one of them as a robustness checks for our estimates. 
The sample is weighted by the STB to ensure national representation. A datapoint is a shipment. 
For that shipment we observe railroad(s) providing the service, origination point, termination point, 
any junctions where the shipment changed railroads, total price charged, the distance of the route, 
the weight of the shipment, the commodity shipped, and well over a hundred other characteristics. 
The industry standard for measuring price is RPTM – revenue per ton mile. Upon computing 
RPTM we found considerable variation. In order to eliminate any potential confounding effects, 
we focus on the most homogeneous commodity that is frequently shipped by rail – coal (STCC 
code 1121290). Up until the explosion of intermodal freight (standard-size containers that can be 
stacked on ships, rail, or trucks), coal was the commodity contributing the most revenue to freight 
railroads. After we focus on coal, the outliers in the RPTM were not as far from the rest of the 
distribution as in the whole sample, however, we still observed occasional shipments with RPTM 
of more than 100 times the median. We eliminate the top 5% and the bottom 5% of RPTM data 
from our sample. Eliminating the top and the bottom 1% does not change our results qualitatively. 
 
  Table 1: Summary statistics.   
 
 Mean p25 Median p75 
lnRPTM -4.002 -4.676 -4.069 -3.478 
Treatment 0.0805 0 0 0 
lnMiles 6.143 5.733 6.415 6.980 
lnTons 9.156 9.200 9.456 9.569 
lnTonsCar 4.702 4.635 4.723 4.777 
lnVolTons 14.432 13.485 14.650 15.592 
DOwn 0.637 0 1 1 
HHIorigin 0.706 0.501 0.505 1 
HHIterm 0.905 .927 1 1 
DMorigin 0.315 0 0 1 
DMterm 0.585 0 1 1 
lnCosts 10.734 10.206 11.117 11.572 
CalcRate 0.604 0 1 1 
 
The variables in Table 1 are the same variables as we use in our analyses below. The variables are 
log of the distance of the route, log of total weight of this shipment, log of weight per loaded railcar, 
volume on that route (to account for possible economies of scale/scope), whether the shipper owns 
the rail car, HHI at the origin of the shipment, HHI at the destination, a binary variable indicating 
whether the railroad is a monopolist at the origin, same variable for the destination, the log of the 
shipment-specific variable cost, and whether the rate is masked in the public sample. 
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3 Main analysis 
Our estimation strategy is as follows.  Consider a shipper that wants to ship coal from A to C, 
a route that passes through B. We estimate whether the price (RPTM) paid from A to C is the 
same when the same railroad owns both AB and BC tracks as it is when one railroad owns AB and 
another owns BC. We estimate difference in prices by comparing otherwise similar routes, with the 
difference being whether the route is wholly-owned. 
We use a pricing specification used by previous railroad-specific research to get our estimates. 
The specification, effectively a hedonic pricing regression, was used by Christensen Associates (2010) 
in a report prepared for the STB – in other words a report by a specialized consulting firm, with 
the industry’s regulator as the customer. The report tweaks a previously existing specification from 
the academic literature, Mac Donald (1989), with the article looking at an unrelated deregulatory 
question. In addition to the exact specification used in the report for the STB, we also include 
shipment-specific costs that have a highly significant coefficient. We do not use proximity of water 
ports that the report used – somewhat surprisingly, they are not statistically significant in our 
estimates and do not change the estimate of interest regardless of whether they are included. 
We also include the treatment variable that we are interested in – whether the shipment is 
served by two railroads or by one. None of the shipments that we observe are served by more than 
two railroads. 
A particular industry practice somewhat complicates our analysis. The railroads are permitted 
to rebill shipments that are served by two railroads. In other words, we often observe a shipment 
served by one railroad with the flag indicating that it was rebilled: instead of observing route AC, 
showing that AB was served by railroad 1 and BC was served by railroad 2, we see AB served 
by railroad 1 with a rebilling flag. There are considerably more rebills in the data than there are 
routes with junctions. If we were to have the universe of shipments, as opposed to a sample, we 
could have connected the missing pieces since BC served by railroad 2 with a rebilling flag would 
have also been in our sample. However, this type of a match is not possible given that we only 
have a sample. Thus, our treatment variable is 1 if we observe either a junction or a rebill. It is 0 
otherwise.6 
Thus, our specification is 
 
lnRPTM = βinteresttreatment+ 
+ β × [lnMiles + lnTons + lnTonsCar + lnV olTons + DOwn + HHIorigin + HHIterm 
+ DMorigin + DMterm + lnCosts + CalcRate] + FEorigin + FEterm 
+ FErailroadorigin + FErailroadterm + FEquarter . 
(1) 
In addition to the variables described above, we also include fixed effects for origin, termination 
point, railroad serving the origin,  railroad serving the termination point (different if there is a 
 
 
6This measurement issue was also noted by McCullough and Thompson (2013). 
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junction), and quarter-year (for example, Q1 of 2001). We cluster our standard errors at the level 
of origin-termination-quarter-year. 
We present the estimation results in Table 2. We estimate seven models in total. First, we 
estimate equation (1) on the whole sample without fixed effects. These results are presented in 
column (1). Next, we estimate the same model with fixed effects. The results are shown in column 
(2). Because our results can be affected by the extreme values of the dependent variable, we 
re-estimate models (1) and (2) on the sample that excludes top and bottom 1% of the PRTM 
distribution and on the sample that excludes top and bottom 5% of the PRTM distribution. These 
results are presented in columns (3)-(6), respectively. Finally, we eliminate top and bottom 5% of 
the RPTM distribution and observations with missing rebill variable7 and re-estimate equation (1). 
These results are presented in column (7). 
The results are very consistent across all models. The effect of treatment is economically 
small and statistically insignificant. The coefficients of other covariates are also pretty consistent 
across the models, except the weight per loaded railcar, HHI at origin and termination point, and 
indicators of monopoly at origin and termination points. 
While the estimates of the treatment effect are consistent across the models, one might worry 
that the results might be affected by trimming the sample and excluding treated observations 
with high revenue per ton mile. Therefore, we present the number of excluded observations by 
treatment group in Table 3. The number of treated observations in top 1% and top 5% of the 
RPTM distribution is very small – 2 and 21 observations, respectively. 
 
 
7The rebill variable is poorly recorded in years 2001 and 2002 with 40% of observations missing. Starting 2003 the 
reporting of this variable has significantly improved and there are no missing values of rebill in 2003. While, there 
are many observations missing in the earlier years, it seems that most of them migrated in ’no rebill’ category in 
2003 – the percent of observations in ’no rebill’ category increased from 60% to 85%. While percent of observations 
in ’rebill’ category increased from 0.4 percent to 15 %. 
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  Table 2: Effect of either a junction or a rebill on price   
 
 (1) 
lnRPTM 
Whole 
(2) 
lnRPTM 
Whole 
(3) 
lnRPTM 
Trim at 1 % 
(4) 
lnRPTM 
Trim at 1 % 
(5) 
lnRPTM 
Trim at 5% 
(6) 
lnRPTM 
Trim at 5% 
(7) 
lnRPTM 
Trim at 5% 
exclude 
missing rebill 
Treatment -0.007 -0.013 0.001 -0.014 0.004 -0.006 -0.002 
 (0.023) (0.008) (0.023) (0.008) (0.024) (0.008) (0.009) 
lnMiles -0.766∗∗∗ -0.919∗∗∗ -0.775∗∗∗ -0.829∗∗∗ -0.833∗∗∗ -0.779∗∗∗ -0.726∗∗∗ 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) 
lnTons -0.344∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.460∗∗∗ -0.174∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.018) (0.030) (0.016) (0.017) 
lnTonscar -0.432∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗ -0.290∗∗∗ -0.063 -0.221∗∗ -0.041 -0.126∗ 
 (0.076) (0.089) (0.077) (0.045) (0.082) (0.039) (0.054) 
lnVoltons -0.072∗∗∗ -0.038∗∗∗ -0.077∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
DOwn -0.081∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.059∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
HHIorigin 0.354∗∗∗ -0.179∗ 0.373∗∗∗ -0.132 0.387∗∗∗ -0.102 -0.194∗∗ 
 (0.043) (0.075) (0.042) (0.070) (0.042) (0.060) (0.064) 
HHIterm 0.063 0.042 0.036 0.049 0.076∗ 0.092 0.107 
 (0.034) (0.069) (0.032) (0.069) (0.030) (0.066) (0.071) 
DMorigin -0.047∗ 0.005 -0.061∗∗ 0.003 -0.057∗∗ 0.007 0.022∗∗∗ 
 (0.020) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.019) (0.006) (0.006) 
DMterm 0.099∗∗∗ -0.004 0.102∗∗∗ -0.001 0.077∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.003 
 (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) 
lnCosts 0.370∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 
 (0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.021) (0.035) (0.019) (0.020) 
CalcRate -0.024∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.047∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.046∗∗∗ -0.051∗∗∗ 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) 
Fixed Effects –  –  –   
N 78,629 78,569 77,057 77,007 70,769 70,728 52,447 
R2 0.86 0.96 0.86 0.97 0.83 0.96 0.97 
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. 
All models with fixed effects include fixed effects for country of origin, destination county, railroad serving 
the origin, railroad serving the termination point, and quarter-year. 
Standard errors are clustered by country of origin, destination county, and quarter-year. 
 
The coefficients on our control variables are generally of the expected sign, statistically signifi- 
cant, and broadly similar to those obtained by both Mac Donald (1989) and Christensen Associates 
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  Table 3: PRTM Extreme Values by Treatment Group   
 
 Top 1% Bottom 1% Top 5% Bottom 5% 
Controls 784 564 3,910 3,2345 
Treated 2 222 21 686 
All 786 786 3,931 3,931 
 
(2010). In particular, the economies associated with longer hauls (Miles), larger shipments (Tons), 
larger loads per car (Tonscar), and higher annual volumes on the route (Voltons) are all reflected in 
negative and statistically significant coefficients in almost all specifications. In terms of magnitudes, 
our estimated coefficients are closer to those of the previous studies for Miles and Voltons, not as 
close for Tons and Tonscar; however, as Christensen Associates (2010) point out, these latter two 
variables are not independent of each other, so that their separated coefficients must be interpreted 
with greater caution. 
 
4 Methodological robustness checks 
 
4.1 Propensity score blocking 
We follow Imbens and Rubin (2015) and estimate causal effect based on subclassification (blocking) 
on the estimated propensity score. First, we estimate the propensity score, or probability of being 
treated, as a function of the variables available in the Waybill sample. Next, we partition the 
sample into blocks based on the values of the estimated propensity score, so that within a block, 
the estimated propensity scores are approximately the same. Then, within each block, we estimate 
causal effect using the fixed effects regression outlined earlier. Finally, the average treatment effect 
for the whole sample is calculated as an average of the within-block estimated treatment effects 
weighted by block sizes. 
Imbens and Rubin (2015) show that within blocks with the same estimated propensity score, 
the super-population distribution of covariates is identical in the treated and control groups. This 
property of the propensity score implies that splitting sample into blocks with approximately con- 
stant propensity score eliminates systematic biases associated with differences in observed covariates 
between treated and control groups, and thus leads to more precise estimates. However, blocking 
alone typically does not eliminate all biases that arise because of the differences in the covariates 
between control and treatment groups, because often even when data are split into smaller groups 
the estimated propensity score is not constant within blocks. Therefore, we run a regression to 
estimate the effect within each block to further reduce bias of estimates. 
The key in the blocking approach is to construct comparable control and treatment group within 
each block. Therefore, the first step is to refine the sample and eliminate outliers in the same way 
as in the previous section – we eliminate observations in the 5 bottom and 5 top percent of the 
RPTM distribution. Additionally, we identify counties with all originating/terminating shipments 
in either control or treatment group and eliminate shipments that originate/terminate in such 
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counties. Ideally, we would use county dummies in our propensity score regression; however, there 
are over a thousand of such dummies, and doing this is not practical. Eliminating counties that 
perfectly predict treatment is effectively doing what a logit propensity score would do if we could 
run the estimation with all the county dummies. 
Finally, we eliminate all shipments for which rebilling flag variable is missing. Initial sample 
includes 72,300 control group observations and 6,331 treatment group observations. We discard 
61,588 observations in total, the vast majority of which is due to the perfect predictor counties 
mentioned above. The final sample includes 16,043 observations, among them 12,860 observations 
are in the control group (18% of the original control group) and 4,183 are in the treatment group 
(66% of the original treatment group).8 
Next, we estimate the propensity score using the following logit specification: 
 
Treatment = γ × [lnMiles + lnTons + lnTonsCar + lnV olTons + DOwn + HHIorigin + HHIterm 
+ DMorigin + DMterm + lnCosts + CalcRate + Share treatedorigin + Share treatedterm] 
+ FErailroadorigin + FErailroadterm + FEquarter . 
(2) 
The control variables are as in equation (1); additionally, Share treatedorigin is a share of 
shipments served by more than one railroad originating in a county  of  shipment  origin,  and 
Share treatedterm is a share of shipments served by more than one railroad terminating in a 
county of shipment final destination (this variable serves as another proxy for having county-level 
dummies in the specification). The results of this estimation are shown in Table 4. 
Next, we discard observations with the estimated propensity score too close to zero or one 
to eliminate units from either control or treatment groups that do not a have good counterpart 
in treatment or control group, respectively. Specifically, we drop observations with propensity 
score above 0.9375 and below 0.0269. The top threshold cuts off the top 0.25% of the untreated 
observations and about 24% of the treated. The bottom threshold cuts off about 4% of the treated 
observations and about 60% of the untreated. Clearly, the data above the top threshold is highly 
skewed towards being treated and the data below the bottom threshold is highly skewed towards 
being untreated. Table 5 displays the subsample sizes by treatment group and propensity score 
value. 
Next, we split the sample into twenty blocks. Table A1 shows the details for these twenty blocks 
including the cut off values for the propensity score, the number of units by treatment status in 
each group, and the standardized differences in control variables and propensity score for the whole 
trimmed sample and within each block.9  The idea is to keep splitting the blocks until either the 
covariates look balanced or until there aren’t enough treated or untreated observations relative to 
 
 
8As Imbens and Rubin (2015) argue, this approach sacrifices some external validity – the final estimates of the 
average treatment effect for the trimmed sample are less likely to be valid for the original sample. However, the 
advantage of this approach is the internal validity, i.e., the estimates of the treatment effect for the trimmed sample 
are more accurate than the estimates of the average treatment effect in the original sample. 
9The standardized difference between two samples for a variable is calculated using the following formula, e.g., for 
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  Table 4: Propensity score estimation.   
 
 (1) 
Treatment 
 
lnMiles -2.594∗∗∗ DMorigin 1.297∗∗∗ 
 (0.319)  (0.166) 
lnTons -3.061∗∗∗ DMterm -0.230∗ 
 (0.334)  (0.094) 
lnTonscar 3.448∗∗∗ lnCosts 3.649∗∗∗ 
 (0.640)  (0.421) 
lnVolTons -0.0646 CalcRate -0.00227 
 (0.038)  (0.083) 
DOwn 0.616∗∗∗ Share treatedorigin 14.18∗∗∗ 
 (0.112)  (0.598) 
HHIorigin -3.346∗∗∗ Share treatedterm 12.48∗∗∗ 
 (0.350)  (0.291) 
HHIterm -0.790∗∗∗ Const -16.75∗∗∗ 
 (0.234)  (2.731) 
N 17,043   
Pseudo R2 0.64   
Standard errors in parentheses. The model also includes originating railroad 
fixed effects, terminating railroad fixed effects, and quarter fixed effects. 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Sample Sizes for Trimming Based on Estimated Propensity Score 
 
 eˆ(Xi) < 0.0269 0.0269 < eˆ(Xi) < 0.9375 eˆ(Xi) > 0.9375 
Controls 7,716 5,112 32 
Treated 164 3,027 992 
All 7,880 8,139 1,024 
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j 
the number of controls in the regression that we run inside each block. Our regression specification 
has over a dozen of observables and even more fixed effects, thus we do not split blocks further if 
we have 30 or fewer treated or 30 or fewer untreated observations. Each individual block is much 
more balanced comparing to the whole sample – the normalized differences between covariates are 
much smaller within the blocks than in the whole sample. Finally, we estimate treatment effect 
within each block using model specified in equation (1). As we show in Table A1, there is sufficient 
difference in the covariate distributions within the blocks and thus regression helps to further adjust 
for these differences. 
We present results for the parameter estimates from the regressions for the twenty blocks in 
Table 6. The overall average treatment effect (ATE) is calculated in the following way: 
 
ATE =      qj × τˆ(j), (3) 
j 
where j = 1, ..., 20 corresponds to the block number; q(j) = N (j)/N , where N (j) is the number of 
observations in block j and N is the total number of observations in the sample; finally, τˆ(j) is the 
within-block least squares estimate of the treatment effect for block j. 
The variance of the overall ATE is calculated in the similar manner: 
 
V (ATE) =     q2 × Vˆ (τˆ(j)), (4) 
j 
where Vˆ (τˆ(j)) is the estimated variance of the treatment effect within block j. 
The results indicate that the ATE equals -0.05 with the standard deviation of 0.02, which 
confirms our main results that shipments served by several railroads are not higher priced than 
shipments served by one railroad. The magnitude of the coefficient is small in the absolute value, 
and is close to the coefficient that we obtain in the main specification. 
 
4.2 Double Machine Learning 
4.2.1 Backgroung on machine learning 
Readers familiar with the standard machine learning techniques and intuition can safely skip this 
subsubsection. 
Supervised machine learning is used to build a prediction model that relates a set of inputs X 
and an outcome variable Y . Machine learning (ML) in this case is called supervised because the 
outcome variable guides the learning process. ML models are designed to optimize prediction, and 
therefore are concerned about overfitting and are not explicitly concerned about unbiased estimates. 
Consequently, ML is tailored for applications when there are many attributes of a unit relative to 
lnMiles:  
     lnM ilestreated − lnM ilescontrol   
s2 2 
treated/Ntreated + scontrol/Ncontrol 
z = 
14 
 
 
Table 6: Independent Least Squares Regressions within Blocks 
 
Block N Est. S.E. 
1 2,069 0.06 0.04 
2 1,201 0.00 0.01 
3 358 -0.09 0.03 
4 151 0.05 0.04 
5 455 0.01 0.02 
6 90 0.01 0.01 
7 255 0.00 0.02 
8 251 -0.23 0.03 
9 58 -0.14 0.07 
10 118 0.00 0.00 
11 78 0.40 0.05 
12 78 0.10 0.08 
13 97 -0.02 0.11 
14 147 -0.30 0.06 
15 120 -0.09 0.08 
16 50 0.11 0.04 
17 167 0.08 0.07 
18 1,088 -0.06 0.06 
19 838 -0.40 0.10 
20 314 -0.01 0.02 
ATE  -0.05* 0.02 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
the number of observations and when one wants to allow flexible functional form between the inputs 
and an output, e.g., when non-linearity might be hard to capture by conventional reduced form 
models. 
While ML techniques excel at prediction they are not necessarily great for causal inference. The 
focus of ML methods is on prediction and improved prediction is sometimes achieved by using biased 
estimates (for example, by placing zero coefficients on some covariates to simplify the model). The 
intuition is explained in Kleinberg et al. (2015) and has to do with variance-bias tradeoff. Suppose 
a training dataset T of n data points (xi, yi) is used to pick a function f to predict y using x. Now, 
consider a mean squared error at a new point x0, MSE(x0): 
MSE(x0) = ET [f (x0) − yˆ0]2 
= ET [yˆ0 − ET (yˆ0)]2 + [ET (yˆ0) − f (x0)]2 
= V arT (yˆ0) + Bias2(yˆ0) 
(5) 
This bias-variance decomposition of the MSE shows that there is a tradeoff between variance and 
bias of the estimate. More generally, as the model complexity increases, the variance tends to 
increase and the squared bias tends to decrease.10 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate is unbiased under some assumptions. However, unbi- 
asedness comes at a cost of higher variance. Gauss-Markov theorem states that the least squares 
estimate has the smallest variance among all unbiased linear estimates, but there exist biased esti- 
mates with smaller variance. For example, setting to zero some of the least squares estimates might 
 
 
10See Hastie et al. (2009) pp. 9-42 for more detail. 
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m 
1+e−v 
result in a small bias and a significant reduction in variance and thus a better prediction. ML meth- 
ods optimize this balance between bias and variance and therefore while potentially outperforming 
OLS in prediction, ML estimates are likely biased. 
ML methods select a subset of the predictors to produce a model that is interpretable and has 
possibly lower prediction error than the full model. In particular, ML techniques minimize: 
 
n 
fˆM L = arg min     (yi f (xi))2 + λR(f ), (6) 
f 
i=1 
where R(f ) is a regularizer that penalizes model complexity. λ ≥ 0 is a complexity parameter that 
controls the amount of shrinkage (i.e., how many coefficients are shrunk toward zero). The larger 
the λ is the more parsimonious is the model.  Regularizer function may take various forms, for 
d 
example for linear models R(fβ ) = 1β1 where d = 1 corresponds to the lasso estimator and d = 2 
corresponds to the ridge and neural networks estimators (in neural networks λ is known as weight 
decay ).11 
Another important technique used in ML to ensure the quality of prediction is cross-validation. 
The data sample is split into training and test sample. First, the model is fitted using the training 
sample. Then the performance of the obtained model is tested on the test sample. This procedure 
allows to avoid overfitting and derives the optimal level of model complexity. 
The ML method that we use in this estimation is neural net. Neural nets have been previously 
used in economics and finance literature (e.g., White (1988), Swanson and White (1997), Qi (1999)). 
Neural nets consist of a number of simple neuron-like processing units, organized in layers. Every 
unit in a layer connected to all the units in a previous layer. These connections are not equal: each 
connection may have a different strength or weight. Data enters at the inputs and passes through 
the network, layer by layer until it arrives at the output. Layers between the inputs and an output 
are called hidden layers as they are not directly observed (latent). In the network that we use for 
our analysis there is no feedback between layers, and thus it is called feed-forward network. Figure 
1 shows a network with several inputs, one output, and one hidden layer. 
Neural nets can be seen as a two-stage non-linear regression. The hidden units Zm are created 
from linear combinations of the inputs, and output variable Yk is modeled as a function of linear 
combinations of Zm: 
 
Zm = σ(α0m + αl X), m = 1, ..., M,  
(7) 
f (X) = β0 + βlZ, 
The activation function σ(v) = 1 is known as sigmoid.  The unknown parameters in neural 
network are called weights: θ = {{α0m, αm : m = 1, 2, ..., M }, {β0, β}}. Weights are found from the 
training data by fitting the model. 
We use sum-of-squared errors as a measure of fit: 
 
11 1 k 2 k 2 
lβl = 
),
i=1 |βk|, lβl = 
),
j=1 βk , where k is the number of controls in a subset chosen by the ML algorithm. 
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Figure 1: Neural Net with One Hidden Layer 
 
 
N 
R(θ) =    (yi − f (xi))2 + λJ (θ), (8) 
i=1 
where J (θ) is a weight decay and 
 
J (θ) =     β2 2 
m ml 
(9) 
The decay parameter penalizes large weights in the neural network and prevents over-fitting. 
The generic approach is to minimize R(θ) + λJ (θ) by gradient descent described in section A in 
the appendix to this paper. 
 
4.2.2 Machine learning and causal inference, application to our estimation 
Even though ML estimators cannot be used for causal inference directly, the estimation tech- 
niques that combine regression and machine learning methods are able to provide valid estimates 
of causal effects. Specifically, we implement double machine learning (DML) estimator developed 
by Chernozhukov et al. (2016). In combination with cross-fitting, the estimator is efficient and 
approximately unbiased and normal. The estimation proceeds as follows. 
First, we model the outcome variable as the following partially linear model: 
 
Y = Dθ0 + g0(Z) + U, (10) 
x1 
x2 
Z1 
x3 Ouput 
Z2 Y 
x4 
xn 
ZM 
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1 
0 
0 
D = m0(Z) + V, (11) 
where E[U |Z, D] = 0 and E[V |Z] = 0. Y is the outcome variable, D is the treatment variable, Z 
is a vector of covariates listed in equation (2), and U and V  are disturbances. The first equation 
is the main equation that we would like to estimate with the parameter of interest θ0. The second 
equation keeps track of confounding, or dependence of treatment variable on covariates.  A set of 
control variables Z impacts outcome variable and treatment variable via the functions g0(Z) and 
m0(Z) respectively. 
DML estimator is obtained by partialing out the effect of Z from both Y and D and estimating 
the regression model implied by equations (10) - (11): 
 
W = V θ0 + U, (12) 
where V = D − m0(Z) and W = Y − l0(Z), where l0(Z) = E[Y |Z] = m0(Z)θ0 + g0(Z). We estimate 
functions m0 and l0 using neural nets. We chose neural nets because this is one of the machine 
learning techniques that is most often used by machine learning researchers due to out-of-sample 
predictive success. In addition, when choosing which machine learning method to use, we were 
driven by our desire to deal flexibly with any potential nonlinearities and interactions. We believe 
that neural nets accomplish this objective better than, for example, post-lasso. 
First, we split the data into two equal subsamples – the training sample and the test sample. 
Next,  we  obtain  parameter  estimates  using  neural  nets  and  the  training  sample  and  construct 
estimates of lˆ0  and 
estimates to form Wˆ 
mˆ 0 using obtained parameters and the test sample.  Finally, we use these 
= Y − ˆl0(Z) and Vˆ = D − mˆ 0(Z) and then obtain “double” ML estimator: 
 
1   
n −1 1  
n 
θˆ0 =           Vˆ 2
 
VˆiWˆ i. (13) 
n i i=1 
n 
i=1 
Chernozhukov et al. (2016) prove that this estimator is root-n consistent and approximately 
Gaussian under a very mild set of conditions. 
As Chernozhukov et al. (2017) noted, the specific sample partitioning has no impact on estima- 
tion results asymptotically but may be important in finite samples. In other words, when estimating 
using a finite sample, the value of the estimator depends on a specific split of the sample. Hence, to 
get asymptotically valid estimates, we repeat estimation procedure S times each time partitioning 
sample in halves. We then report estimates that incorporate information from the distribution of 
the estimates obtained from the different data partitions. As a result, we report mean estimate 
based on S obtained estimates of the parameter of interest: 
 
θˆM ean 
S  
ˆs
 
0 = S 
 
s=1 
θ0, (14) 
where θˆs is a point estimate obtained in each of S estimations. Finally, we calculate the standard 
error of the θˆmean that incorporates additional variation due to different data splits: 
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S 
   
  
σˆM ean =    
1       
σˆ2 + (θˆs − θˆM ean)2  , (15)   
S
 
where σˆs is obtained using equation (??). 
s 0 0 
s=1 
We present the results in Table 7. We trim the top and the bottom 5% of the RPTM distribution 
as before. We implement neural net estimator using a 2-fold cross-fitting (splitting sample in halves) 
with 10 hidden layers and a decay parameter of 0.01, which prevents over-fitting. We repeat the 
main procedure 100 times repartitioning data in each replication. The result is again very similar 
to the result in the the main specification. 
 
Table 7: Effect of either a junction or a rebill on price, double machine learning. 
ATE -0.06*** 
(0.016) 
N 70,728 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
 
 
5 Identification robustness check: BNSF merger 
On December 31st 1996 two major railroads merged, ATSF and BN, creating the largest railroad 
in the U.S., BNSF. Although the ATSF and BN were primarily parallel rather than interconnecting 
railroads – for years they joined the Southern Pacific and Union Pacific as the four major railroads 
serving the western US – there were some routes on which they connected to provide end-to-end 
service. Cournot analysis, or the presence of double marginalization, would suggest that if any 
route went from being served as a connecting route by ATSF and BN to being served by a single 
company BNSF, the price on that route should decrease. However, so would economies of scale 
or scope coming from the merger. Following previous academic work suggesting that it takes a 
couple of years for any economies of scale or scope to materialize, we use years 1995 – 1999 to 
test the hypothesis of whether price decreased on previously separately-owned routes following the 
merger.12 
It turns out that only three coal routes were affected in this way (served by ATSF and BN as 
connecting carriers before the merger), all originating in Wyoming. As a part of getting the merger 
approved by the STB, BNSF agreed to give trackage rights to another railroad (UP) for one of the 
routes. That could of course lead to an immediate price drop due to competition on this route that 
is now served by both the combined ATSF and, through trackage rights, the UP; thus, we do not 
use this route. Therefore, we have two routes left. 
We use a difference-in-differences specification mirroring our setup in the main analysis. Thus, 
instead of the treatment variable in the main analysis,  we have a variable for affected routes, 
 
 
12See Ivaldi and McCullough (2005). See also Berndt, Friedlaender, Chiang, and Vellturo (1993). 
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another variable for post-merger, and finally yet another variable for the interaction (difference- 
in-differences) term. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term.  Thus, our specification 
is 
 
lnRPTM = βinterestP ost × AffectedRoutes + βpostP ost + βaffectedAffectedRoutes 
+ β × [lnMiles + lnTons + lnTonsCar + lnV olTons + DOwn + HHIorigin + HHIterm 
+ DMorigin + DMterm + lnCosts + CalcRate] + FEorigin + FEterm + FErailroadorigin 
+ FErailroadterm + FEquarter . 
(16) 
The variable names and clustering are the same as in the main analysis. In particular, we use 
the same controls and the same fixed effects.13 
We are also not sure when exactly the price change would have occurred post-merger if it 
indeed occurred. In other words, it might have taken some time for BNSF to synchronize the 
pricing systems. Thus, we run specification with the first quarter, first two quarters, and first year 
post-merger thrown out. Our coefficient of interest does not change significantly.  The results are 
in Table 8 and, while noisy, are consistent with the results that we presented earlier. 
As with any difference-in-differences analysis, a parallel trend graph helps with convincing 
ourselves that we have the correct identification strategy. We present the graph below, with the 
graph not corrected for any controls. We demean the RPTM for affected routes to preserve pricing 
anonimity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Pricing trends for affected and unaffected routes, with the merger occurring on Dec 31st 
1996. 
 
 
13Note that the term βpostP ost is unnecessary given the quarter-year fixed effects. We still have it in the regression 
simply to make the point that we are using the standard difference-in-differences setup.  The downside is the large 
magnitude and no statistical significance on coefficient βpost. 
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  Table 8: Effect of merger on price of affected routes   
 
 (1) 
lnRPTM 
(2) 
lnRPTM 
(without 1997Q1) 
(3) 
lnRPTM 
(without 1997Q1 & Q2) 
(4) 
lnRPTM 
(without 1997) 
DD 0.00355 0.0125 0.0214 0.00978 
 (0.0359) (0.0397) (0.0399) (0.0426) 
post -7605.9 -1972.3 1409.2 -242.3 
 (5118458.0) (2691777.1) (3536224.9) (2711872.8) 
affectedroutes -0.239∗ 
(0.114) 
-0.257∗ 
(0.118) 
-0.568∗∗∗ 
(0.0664) 
-0.595∗∗∗ 
(0.0695) 
lnMiles -0.570∗∗∗ 
(0.0129) 
-0.571∗∗∗ 
(0.0131) 
-0.576∗∗∗ 
(0.0134) 
-0.586∗∗∗ 
(0.0142) 
lnTons 0.00953 0.00862 0.00542 -0.00684 
 (0.00978) (0.0100) (0.0104) (0.0108) 
lnTonscar -0.169∗∗∗ 
(0.0194) 
-0.166∗∗∗ 
(0.0199) 
-0.162∗∗∗ 
(0.0205) 
-0.150∗∗∗ 
(0.0222) 
lnVol tons -0.0203∗∗∗ 
(0.00204) 
-0.0197∗∗∗ 
(0.00209) 
-0.0191∗∗∗ 
(0.00210) 
-0.0189∗∗∗ 
(0.00217) 
D own -0.0856∗∗∗ 
(0.00419) 
-0.0858∗∗∗ 
(0.00429) 
-0.0851∗∗∗ 
(0.00441) 
-0.0807∗∗∗ 
(0.00460) 
HHI origin 0.0348 0.0334 0.0314 0.0265 
 (0.0213) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0246) 
HHI term -0.0461∗ -0.0487∗ -0.0567∗ -0.0456 
 (0.0191) (0.0206) (0.0221) (0.0267) 
D monopoly origin 0.00524 0.00339 0.00107 -0.00943 
 (0.00555) (0.00565) (0.00563) (0.00544) 
D monopoly term 0.000639 0.00140 0.00326 0.00430 
 (0.00504) (0.00520) (0.00534) (0.00596) 
lnVar costs -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0429∗∗∗ -0.0389∗∗ -0.0233 
 (0.0119) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0131) 
calc rate f -0.183∗∗∗ 
(0.00566) 
-0.180∗∗∗ 
(0.00577) 
-0.174∗∗∗ 
(0.00584) 
-0.163∗∗∗ 
(0.00595) 
N 191565 183418 174784 157296 
Standard errors in parentheses 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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6 Conclusion 
We found that, in the U.S. freight rail, prices for shipping coal are not consistent with a Cournot-like 
complementary monopoly outcome. Instead, we find evidence consistent with an equilibrium, where 
complementary monopolists on routes AB and BC do not charge more than a single monopolist 
would charge if she were to own the whole route AC. 
Our results are directly applicable to the U.S. freight railroad market: for example, we show that 
an end-to-end railroad merger would not be needed to fix a Cournot or double-marginalization-like 
pricing issue in this market. However, one should be cautious when extrapolating from our results 
to other settings. 
In particular, while railroads and products requiring multiple patents share the potential for 
a Cournot-like outcome, there are many important differences. First, products like cell phones 
oftentimes require hundreds of patents, instead of any coal company being able to ship using only 
two railroads in our setting. It is possible that a much higher number of complementary monopolists 
results in a Cournot-like outcome. Second, in the intellectual property realm, at least some of the 
often-discussed issues are around unscrupulous entities that use ‘deceptive sales claims and phony 
legal threats’ in order to attempt to collect royalties on invalid patents, effectively threatening a 
strike suit.14 This is, of course, not possible for railroads to do. Third, while another concern in the 
intellectual property realm is that occasionally manufacturers do not even realize that their product 
impinges on patents, coal companies know for sure that they will have to use railroads to transport 
coal before they open a coal mine. On the other hand, fourth, while many manufacturers are also 
patent holders, so that oftentimes patents might be used defensively, freight railroads typically do 
not mine coal themselves. 
We hope that our study inspires further work in this area, and in particular more direct analyses 
of whether the Cournot hypothesis holds in particular markets. Ideally, economists, legal scholars, 
and other interested researchers will analyze similar data from the industries and countries where 
such data is available. Then, upon having multiple such studies, we could make educated hypotheses 
about more industries and, in particular, the degree to which, if any, the four differences above 
change our conclusions. 
 
 
14See,  for  example,  the  FTC’s  MPHJ  settlement,  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/11/ftc- 
settlement-bars-patent-assertion-entity-using-deceptive. 
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m + α 
m 
A Fitting of Neural Networks 
To find the set of weights θ that yield the best prediction in the neural network we minimize the 
sum of sum-of-squared errors R(θ) and weight decay J (θ)15 
 
N 
R(θ) + λJ (θ) =     (yi − f (xi))2 + λJ (θ) = 
i=1 
 
 
(17) 
N M M N  
(yi − f (xi))2 + λ(     β2      2 ml 
i=1 m=1 m=1 l=1 
Conventionally this function is minimized by gradient descent. Given a function defined by a 
set of parameters, gradient descent starts with an initial set of parameter values and iteratively 
moves toward a set of parameter values that minimize the function. This iterative minimization 
is achieved by taking steps in the negative direction of the function gradient. In this case, the 
gradient is easily derived using the chain rule: 
 
∂Ri 
 
 
∂βm 
= −2(yi — f (xi))zmi + 2λβm, 
 
(18) 
∂Ri 
 
 
∂αml 
= −2(yi — f (xi))βm σl(αmi xi)xil + 2λαml. 
Given these derivatives, the gradient descent update at the (r + 1)st iteration has the form 
 
 
β(r+1) 
 
(r) 
N    ∂Ri 
m = βm   − γr (r) , 
i=1 ∂βm 
N 
 
(19) 
α(r+1) (r) 
   ∂Ri 
 
 
where γ is called a learning rate. 
ml = αml − γr (r) 
, 
i=1 ∂αml 
Now, equation (18) can be rewritten as  
 
∂Ri 
 
 
∂βm 
 
 
= δizmi, 
 
 
 
(20) 
∂Ri 
 
 
∂αml 
= smi xil, 
The quantities δi and smi are called “errors” from the current model at the output and hidden 
layers, respectively. From equations (18) and (20) 
 
smi = σl(αT xi)βmδi, (21) 
which is known as a back-propagation equations. Then the gradient in (19) is updated using a two- 
pass algorithm.  First, in the forward pass, the current weights are fixed and the predicted values 
 
 
15This algorithm is thoroughly described in Hastie et al. (2009), pp. 395-396. 
). 
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fˆ(xi) are computed using equation (7). Next in the backward pass, the errors δi are computed, and 
then back-propagated via (21) to obtain the errors smi. Finally, δi and smi are used to update the 
gradient in (19). 
There are certain guidelines that are recommended to successfully use neural networks. First, 
the starting values are chosen to be random values near zero. Second, it is recommended to use 
weight decay to avoid overfitting. It might be useful to scale inputs to have zero mean and standard 
deviation one – it ensures that inputs are treated equally in the regularization process and gives 
a higher quality prediction. Finally, it is better to have many hidden layers than too few to allow 
for model flexibility. Usually the number of hidden layers varies from 5 to 100. Hastie, Tibshirani, 
and Friedman (2009) provide a discussion of these guidelines. Finally, we use the R package nnet 
to train our neural network. 
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  Table A1: Normalized Differences in the Covariates after Subclassification, for Trimmed Sample   
Block 
 
 Whole 
Sample 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
lnMiles 11.06 3.17 1.83 3.21 3.32 0.07 -1.71 -5.35 2.88 2.40 3.64 
lnTons 8.21 -3.37 -3.93 -1.87 -0.62 -1.79 0.33 -1.16 -3.82 0.51 -1.24 
lnVolTons 14.25 -10.80 -6.07 -4.55 0.76 -2.87 -2.54 -2.40 -4.72 0.18 -0.92 
Down 9.04 -5.69 1.87 -2.35 1.29 -3.41 0.93 2.23 -0.29 0.42 -2.00 
lnCosts 10.81 2.77 -0.12 2.16 2.43 -0.45 -1.29 -5.60 0.94 1.72 2.80 
lnTonsCar 10.40 -0.82 -1.21 -1.20 -1.27 -3.25 -0.38 4.04 -2.23 -1.95 -0.20 
HHIorigin -7.20 9.32 4.90 1.79 -1.47 0.98 2.47 2.83 0.44 -0.04 2.96 
HHIterm -9.70 2.39 -2.28 0.42 1.79 -6.31 2.75 2.65 -1.72 0.23 4.39 
DMorigin -2.61 11.37 4.18 1.97 -1.16 2.10 3.48 2.92 -1.16 0.30 1.25 
DMterm -6.71 1.92 -2.01 -4.66 -2.69 -0.68 3.50 1.72 -1.19 1.13 2.84 
CalcRate -3.67 2.07 3.11 3.72 4.10 -0.24 1.51 1.83 -1.14 0.21 -0.59 
P-Score 100.79 0.18 4.39 1.22 -0.04 -4.24 2.16 -3.36 4.16 1.52 -1.58 
Min P-Score 0.027 0.027 0.069 0.129 0.152 0.164 0.232 0.262 0.365 0.419 0.455 
Max P-Score 0.938 0.069 0.129 0.152 0.164 0.232 0.262 0.365 0.419 0.455 0.510 
# Controls 12,860 2,026 1,174 324 128 436 71 216 210 34 96 
# Treated 4,183 45 43 42 31 31 31 47 47 32 31 
     Block       
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20  
lnMiles 6.90 0.33 2.86 5.95 -0.71 -0.83 -3.92 0.09 -0.68 -0.21  
lnTons -0.49 0.91 1.59 2.26 2.86 1.36 3.15 2.83 2.94 9.17  
lnVolTons 1.06 0.61 2.45 4.25 1.70 0.16 1.30 3.45 3.27 1.32  
Down -2.08 -0.77 -1.72 -2.62 1.27 2.57 6.42 3.16 2.11 0.50  
lnCosts 4.48 0.25 2.41 6.54 -0.03 -0.06 -2.61 0.35 -0.22 1.41  
lnTonsCar -1.15 1.46 1.35 1.68 4.30 1.72 0.28 2.05 1.94 0.13  
DMorigin 0.27 1.75 0.20 -1.63 -1.75 -1.00 -3.96 -2.77 -3.23 -1.17  
HHIterm -2.04 -0.28 3.78 5.35 6.31 2.03 1.59 -0.88 0.16 4.71  
DMorigin -2.65 0.85 0.36 -1.62 -1.74 -0.70 -3.02 -2.46 -3.23 -1.22  
DMterm -2.46 -0.06 3.90 4.10 6.21 2.00 0.74 -1.03 -0.45 0.16  
CalcRate -2.94 -0.79 -2.03 -1.47 1.42 1.57 2.85 0.60 0.33 -0.72  
P-Score 1.02 1.16 0.17 -0.22 -1.51 1.13 0.89 1.04 0.44 -2.15  
Min P-Score 0.510 0.547 0.565 0.592 0.612 0.641 0.672 0.758 0.865 0.922  
Max P-Score 0.547 0.565 0.592 0.612 0.641 0.672 0.758 0.865 0.922 0.938  
# Controls 54 52 42 27 31 31 47 52 30 31  
# Treated 30 33 63 126 95 30 126 1,044 813 287  
 
